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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
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v. : 
COREY L. BROOKS, : Case No. 920853-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Petitioner Brooks files this petition for rehearing. 
Utah R. App. P. 35; see also Cumminqs v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 
P. 619, 624 (1912) ("petitions for rehearings [are proper if] . . . 
we have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or decision which 
may affect the result, or that we have based the decision on some 
wrong principle of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the result . . . " ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this petition, Corey Brooks agrees with 
this Court's summary of the "case" as set forth in its opinion. See 
State v. Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah App. 1993) (a copy 
of the opinion is attached in Addendum A). Mr. Brooks reiterates, 
however, that at trial he was represented by Nick H. Porterfield.1 
1. Mr. Porterfield was counsel for Mr. Brooks at a second 
trial. The first trial resulted in a mistrial because of a hung 
jury. (R 32-37). 
(R 76); Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, page 3. Following the jury's 
verdict, Mr. Porterfield withdrew as counsel. (R 76); Appellee's 
brief, pages 3, 12. The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association then 
was appointed to represent Mr. Brooks on appeal. The differences in 
counsel are significant because the arguments on appeal, 
particularly the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, relate 
directly to the actions or inactions below. In parts of this 
Court's opinion, however, issues were treated as not being preserved 
when appellate counsel specifically noted prior counsel's 
ineffectiveness as a basis for review. 
Following the issuance of the October 29, 1993, opinion, 
Mr. Brooks received a fifteen day enlargement of time for filing 
this Petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issue presented in this petition for rehearing focuses 
on whether this Court overlooked or improperly resolved the 
sentencing issue. A statement of facts beyond what has already been 
presented in the briefs is unnecessary for this petition. See 
Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26; Appellee's brief, 
pages 33-35; Reply brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 14-15 (copies of these 
pages are attached in Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In its opinion this Court acknowledged that had Mr. Brooks 
argued "plain error" on appeal, such an analysis would "[allow] us 
to address [his illegal punishment claim] for the first time on 
- 2 
appeal." Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19. Mr. Brooks did in fact 
argue plain error, as well as "ineffective assistance of counsel" 
and the applicability of a governing rule. See Opening brief of 
Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26; Reply brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 14-15. He 
respectfully requests that this Court address whether the underlying 
sentence should be vacated as his argument was apparently overlooked 
in the opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT OVERLOOKED APPELLATE COUNSEL'S 
PRESENTATION OF THE "PLAIN ERROR" DOCTRINE AND HIS 
ARGUMENTS RELATING TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
In its opinion, this Court appropriately acknowledged 
Mr. Brooks argument on whether the "convictions for robbery and 
burglary illegally punish[ed] him twice for the same crime, since 
#one could not have committed the robbery without necessarily 
committing the burglary.'" See State v. Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15, 19 (Utah App. 1993). While the opinion correctly stated that 
prior trial counsel had failed "to raise this issue before the trial 
court[,]" id., the opinion then incorrectly stated that Mr. Brooks' 
appellate counsel did "not argue that the trial court committed 
plain error in sentencing him for burglary, thus allowing us to 
address it for the first time on appeal, . . . " Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Overlooked by the opinion were direct arguments to the 
contrary. As Mr. Brooks' appellate counsel explicitly stated, the 
trial court committed plain error at sentencing: 
- 3 -
this Court should utilize the plain error doctrine to 
address the merits of Mr. Brooks' illegal sentence. 
The error in convicting and sentencing Mr. Brooks for 
one crime should have been plain to the the trial 
court. Allowing Mr. Brooks to suffer a superfluous 
first degree felony conviction and sentence is 
prejudicial. 
Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, page 26 (copies of the pertinent pages 
are attached in Addendum B). 
The State also acknowledged that appellate counsel's "plain 
error" argument was based on prior defense counsel's failure to 
present the sentencing issue, although it disagreed with the legal 
merits of the issue. See Appellee's brief, page 34 (according to 
the State, "[t]his Court need consider neither plain error nor 
counsel ineffectiveness as bases for overcoming defendant's 
trial-level waiver of this argument"). In short, in response to 
Mr. Brooks' appellate arguments, the State substantively addressed 
the illegal sentencing argument and it did not contend that 
appellate counsel was barred procedurally from presenting the 
issue. The issue should have been considered. 
Having held already that the plain error doctrine would 
"thus [allow] us to address it for the first time on appeal, . . . " 
225 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19, in accordance with this Court's own 
acknowledgment the opinion should fully analyze whether the sentence 
was improper. See also Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26 (in 
addition to the "plain error" doctrine, appellate counsel also based 
review on the "ineffective assistance of counsel" principle and Utah 
R. App. P. 22(e)). 
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In addition, this Court incorrectly concluded that it could 
not correct an illegal sentence on appeal. See Brooks, 225 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 19; but see Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Babbel, 
770 P.2d 987 (Utah 1989) ("Babbel I"). In Babbel I, however, the 
Utah Supreme Court reviewed a State sentencing argument on appeal 
even though the State raised its claim for the first time during 
oral argument. See id at 993 (emphasis added) ("the State, at oral 
argument, raised an issue with respect to the lawfulness of the 
sentence imposed"). "[The State] explained that this issue was not 
briefed because [it] thought it might be resolved by the county 
attorney before the appeal would be argued." Id. at 994. 
Importantly, the issue there did not have to be first resubmitted at 
the trial court level, although such a step had been contemplated 
and was then available to the State. Id; accord State v. Babbel, 
813 P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991) ("Babbel II"). 
The Babbel I Court fully considered and analyzed the 
sentencing issue, notwithstanding the State's presentation of the 
issue for the first time on appeal. Babbel I, 770 P.2d at 993-94. 
In its order remanding the matter for resentencing, the appellate 
opinion pointed out "the unquestioned fact of error." Id. at 994. 
The trial court was clearly instructed on the issue. 
"The error in sentencing occurred because both the defense 
attorney and the prosecutor [improperly advised] the judge [on the 
applicable sentence]." Babbel II, 813 P.2d at 86. The resulting 
trial court error, a sentence unfavorable to the State, was then 
appropriately analyzed for the first time on appeal. 
- 5 -
Just as the State's appellate attorney there was permitted 
to correct the county attorney's performance, Mr. Brooks' appellate 
attorney similarly requests a directive here to correct his trial 
counsel's deficient performance. Due to prior trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, Mr. Brooks was limited in his ability to raise the 
issue until the appeal. At the earliest possible stage of his 
appeal, though, appellate counsel2 properly presented his arguments. 
See Opening brief of Mr. Brooks, pages 23-26. Unlike other cases 
where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not raised, 
in the case at bar Mr. Brooks' appellate counsel properly presented 
the involved issue3 for this Court's review. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Brooks respectfully requests a rehearing by this Court 
on whether "his sentence underlying the burglary conviction is 
illegal and should be vacated." See Brooks, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 19. Appellate counsel's presentation of the plain error doctrine 
"thus allow[ed] [the Court] to address it for the first time on 
appeal[.]" Id. 
2. Prior to this petition for rehearing, Mr. Brooks' 
appellate counsel was Elizabeth Holbrook. 
3. For the reasons discussed previously in his opening 
brief and in his reply brief, Mr. Brooks continues to maintain the 
other briefed issues. Nonetheless, the issues briefed there were 
not "overlooked" in the same manner as the argument presented in 
this petition and hence are not contained herein. 
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Before Judges Bench, Russon, and Garff.1 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Cory L. Brooks appeals his conviction for 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1990), 
and aggravated burglary, a first degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1990). 
Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by 
not removing for cause certain jurors, that his 
trial counsel was ineffective, and that he is being 
illegally punished twice for the same crime. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
Defendant responded to a newspaper 
advertisement placed by Stephanie Vert, offering 
for sale a distinctive diamond ring. Defendant 
examined the ring in the Vert's home, spending 
thirty to forty-five minutes with Stephanie and 
her mother, Martha Vert. Defendant indicated 
that he wished to purchase the ring and that he 
would return to their home the next morning for 
that purpose. 
Stephanie was the only one home the next 
morning when defendant arrived. Stephanie 
invited defendant in and offered him some 
coffee. Defendant picked up the diamond ring 
and then pointed a pistol at Stephanie and 
ordered her to crawl into a bathroom. Defendant 
then produced handcuffs and ordered Stephanie 
to handcuff herself to plumbing beneath the 
sink. When Stephanie did not handcuff herself to 
defendant's satisfaction, he produced a set of 
keys and ordered her to recuff herself. He then 
threatened her by saying, "You better not 
remember what I look l ike / 
Defendant spent ten to twelve minutes 
rummaging through the Vert's home. Using a 
walkie-talkie, he spoke to an apparent 
accomplice, arranging to be picked up outside 
the Vert's home. After defendant left, Stephanie 
freed herself by unscrewing the plumbing and 
then called for help. The Verts claimed that 
defendant stole several thousand dollars worth of 
jewelry, including the diamond ring, from their 
home. 
Shortly after the robbery, defendant visited 
with friends and offered to sell them some 
jewelry, including a diamond ring. During this 
visit, defendant and his friends saw a television 
account of the Vert robbery. Defendant boasted 
that he was the one who had committed the 
robbery. Before defendant left, he gave his 
friends a chain taken from the Vert home. The 
friends subsequently called the police and turned 
the chain over to them. Martha Vert later 
identified the chain as one of the items stolen 
from her home. 
Stephanie gave an accurate description of 
defendant the day of the robbery, and later 
positively identified defendant from a photo 
array. Several months after the crime, she also 
positively identified defendant from a lineup. 
Martha Vert had difficulty identifying defendant 
from the photo array, but she independently 
identified him from the lineup as the person who 
had come to her home and examined the ring the 
night before the robbery. 
Defendant was charged with aggravated 
robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
Defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial due to 
a hung jury. 
Prior to the second trial, the trial court 
conducted voir dire of prospective jurors. Initial 
voir dire by the trial court involved ascertaining 
whether prospective jurors had any acquaintance 
with the parties, court personnel, attorneys, or 
witnesses. The trial court then explained the 
charges, and determined that none of the 
prospective jurors had heard of the case against 
defendant. 
The court then engaged in the following 
exchange: 
THE COURT: Are there any of you who 
have any pressing or urgent business or 
personal matters over the next four days that 
would prevent you from providing 
satisfactory jury service over the next four 
days? 
MR. BARBER: My name is Frank L. 
Barber. 
THE COURT: Frank what? 
MR. BARBER: Barber, B-a-r-b-e-r. 
THE COURT: What is your problem? 
MR. BARBER: Since I qualified for the 
jury list my wife has had knee surgery and 
I'm required to take her for therapy three 
times a week, Monday, Wednesdays and 
Fridays at 5:00 o'clock in Sandy. 
THE COURT: Could other arrangements be 
made? 
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MR. BARBER: I have been unable to so 
far. 
THE COURT: You are working on it? 
MR. BARBER: Weil, she has until - a 
week from today she goes in to the doctor 
to see if the therapy has been successful. 
THE COURT: I understand. But the 
question was: Is there any other possibility 
to work out other arrangements? 
MR. BARBER: I don't have anyone I could 
trust her with. 
THE COURT: You haven't called the 
therapist to see if that could be moved back 
20 or 30 minutes? 
MR. BARBER: No I haven't. 
THE COURT: Ordinarily, we are in recess. 
So, if you are selected, the Court would 
appreciate having you see if that — the time 
could be changed; and we'd recess in time 
enough to allow you to do that. Given that 
accommodation, do you feel that you could 
serve? 
MR. BARBER: I am not sure that I could 
devote my undivided attention to the case 
under the circumstances. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Barber did not indicate that he would, in 
any way, be biased against either the defense or 
the prosection. 
The trial court also asked the prospective 
jurors whether they had ever been subjected to 
any assaults or threats, and whether any had 
been victim of a burglary. Several prospective 
jurors responded affirmatively. The trial court 
engaged in the following conversation with the 
prospective jurors who had responded 
affirmatively: 
JUROR GEURTS: On two different 
occasions we've had somebody walk in our 
unlocked back door and take my purse. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
JUROR HEAP: I've had - Daniel Heap. 
I've had my house broken into before, and 
our vehicles twice in the last couple of 
years. 
THE COURT: Thank You. 
JUROR PIKE: Larry Pike. As a child our 
home was burglarized when we were there. 
THE COURT: Anyone else? 
The court then addressed a series of four 
questions to ascertain whether the prospective 
jurors could try the case fairly and impartially. 
The court asked whether the prospective jurors 
would be willing to have their own guilt or 
innocence determined by people in the same 
frame of mind as the prospective jurors. The 
court also asked the prospective jurors whether, 
in their present state of mind, there was 
anything that would prevent them from acting 
fairly and impartially on the evidence presented 
without prejudicing the substantial rights of 
either party. None of the prospective jurors 
offered a response that would indicate bias. 
Mrs. Geurts was questioned further in 
chambers because her husband had been a 
BrOOkS Code«Co 
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defense witness in a case prosecuted by the 
prosecutor in the instant case. The prosecutor 
also believed that he and Mrs. Geurts had 
attended the same church in the past. When 
questioned by defense counsel, Mrs. Geurts 
indicated that these factors would not affect her 
impartiality in hearing the case. Neither counsel 
moved to strike for cause prospective jurors 
Geurts, Heap, Pike, or Barber. Defense counsel 
used a peremptory challenge to remove Geurts. 
Heap, Pike, and Barber served on defendant's 
jury. 
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated 
robbery and aggravated burglary. Defendant was 
given concurrent sentences for each offense and 
ordered to pay fines and restitution. Because 
defendant used a pistol to commit the offenses, 
and because he was on parole when he 
committed them, the trial court found defendant 
guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a restricted person and his sentences were 
enhanced under the firearm enhancement statute. 
The sentences were imposed to run 
consecutively to another uncompleted sentence at 
the Utah State Prison. 
ISSUES 
Defendant argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that the trial court committed plain error by not 
removing for cause prospective jurors Geurts, 
Heap, Pike, and Barber. In the alternative, 
defendant argues that his trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective because he failed to 
request an adequate voir dire of the prospective 
jurors. Defendant also argues, for the first time 
on appeal, that his convictions for robbery and 
burglary illegally punish him twice for the same 
crime. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
At trial, defense counsel passed the jury for 
cause, without in any way objecting to 
prospective jurors Geurts, Heap, Pike, or 
Barber. Where, on appeal, defendant challenges 
the trial court's failure to remove prospective 
jurors and, at trial defense counsel did not move 
to strike the prospective jurors for cause, we 
utilize a "plain error'' standard of review. State 
v. Ellifiitz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 
1992).2 The requirements for determining 
whether plain error has occurred were 
articulated in State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 S. 
Ct. 62 (1989), as follows: 
The first requirement for a finding of plain 
error is that the error be "plain," i.e., from 
our examination of the record, we must be 
able to say that it should have been obvious 
to a trial court that it was committing error. 
. . . The second and somewhat interrelated 
requirement for a finding of plain error is 
that the error affect the substantial rights of 
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Id. at 35 (citations omitted). 
Therefore, even if we can conclude that the 
trial court made an obvious error, we will not 
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reverse unless defendant demonstrates that, 
absent the error, there is a sufficient likelihood 
of a different result. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d at 174. 
"There is a sufficient likelihood of a different 
result when the appellate court's confidence in 
the verdict is undermined." Id. (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 2068 (1984)). 
As an alternative means of challenging the 
jury selection procedures for the first time on 
appeal, defendant claims that his trial counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective. When a 
defendant raises the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, we "indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, 
the challenged action 'might be considered sound 
trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S. Ct. at 2065 (quotingMichel v. Louisiana, 350 
U.S. 91 , 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164 (1955)). "In 
order to bring a successful ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment, a defendant must show [1] that 
trial counsel's performance was deficient in that 
it 'fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,' and [2] that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the outcome of the 
trial." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, P.2d (Utah 1993) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2064) (footnote omitted).3 | 
When a defendant raises both the issues of i 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
on direct appeal, a common standard is 
applicable. I 
The common standard exists because plain 
error requires a showing that absent the 
error, there is a substantial likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for defendant, and 
similarly, the ineffective assistance standard 
requires a showing that but for the 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the result 
would likely have been different for 
defendant. Failure to meet the plain error 
requirement of prejudice means that 
defendant likewise fails to meet the required 
showing under the ineffective assistance of 
counsel standard. 
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174 (citation omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant argues that the trial court 
committed plain error by not removing for cause 
prospective jurors Geurts, Pike, Heap, and 
Barber. Specifically, defendant argues that 
Geurts, Heap, and Pike were biased against him, 
and that Barber was incompetent to serve on the 
jury. Defendant also argues that since 
prospective juror Geurts should have been 
removed for cause, it was reversible error to 
compel him to use one of his peremptory 
challenges to remove her. 
Juror Bias 
"An accused has a right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
448 (Utah 1988) (footnote omitted); accord U.S. 
Const, amends. V, VI; Utah Const, art. I, §§7, 
10 & 12; and Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). Voir 
dire serves two functions: "the detection of 
actual bias [sufficient to challenge for cause], 
and the collection of data to permit informed 
exercise of the peremptory challenge." State v. 
Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). The scope of the voir dire 
inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court because only the trial court knows when it 
is satisfied that a prospective juror is impartial. 
Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App.), cert, 
denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988); accord State 
v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Lacey, 665 P.2d 1311, 1312 (Utah 
1983); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). 
A question of potential bias arises when a 
prospective juror has been the victim of a 
similar crime. When such a question arises, the 
trial court must probe to determine whether the 
prospective juror is, in fact, impartial despite the 
past experience. This is generally accomplished 
by the trial court simply asking if the juror can 
be impartial. See, e.g., Jonas, 793 P.2d at 
905-06; Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931-32. If, after 
probing the prospective juror's state of mind, 
the trial court is satisfied that the juror can view 
and weigh the evidence impartially, the inquiry 
is at an end. 
In the present case, prospective jurors Geurts, 
Heap, and Pike indicated that they had all been 
victims of similar crimes. Thus a question of 
bias was raised with respect to all three jurors. 
The trial court was therefore required to probe 
further to determine if the prospective jurors 
would be, in fact, impartial despite having been 
victims of similar crimes. The trial court asked 
the following four questions: 
If you or a member of your family were 
involved in a case such as the one before 
you, would you be willing to have your case 
or theirs tried by eight people in the same 
frame of mind as you are now in? 
Possessing the state of mind that you 
have, is there anything that would prevent 
any of you from acting fairly and 
impartially without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of either party in this case? 
Is there any reason known to any of you 
why you could not try the case fairly and 
impartially upon any evidence and without 
any bias for or against either party to the 
action? . . . . 
From your answers, I understand that 
each of you individually now declares to me 
that you can listen attentively to the 
evidence, can apply the law to the facts 
which you may find to exist and can reach 
a verdict which is fair and impartial as to 
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each party in this controversy. Are there 
any of you who for any reason feel that you 
cannot? 
None of the prospective jurors offered a 
response that would indicate any bias as a result 
of having been victims similar crimes. 
In State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991), 
three prospective jurors indicated that they had 
been victims of similar crimes. The trial court 
asked the three prospective jurors collectively 
the following question: 
Those three of you who have responded, 
recognizing that this is a different time and 
place and circumstances, would that 
experience, having been the victim of that 
type of crime, affect your ability to be fair 
and impartial in this case, that is, would you 
be unable to set aside that experience and 
hear the evidence in this case and rule on 
the evidence based upon what you hear and 
the credibility of the witnesses? If you 
would not be able to do so, I want you to 
raise your hand. 
Id. None of the prospective jurors raised a hand 
to indicate any bias from having been victims of 
similar crimes. Defense counsel moved to strike 
all three jurors for cause. The trial court initially 
removed all three jurors but subsequently 
reinstated one of the removed jurors. Defense 
counsel then removed the reinstated juror with a 
peremptory challenge. The court held that when 
prospective jurors indicate that they have been 
victims of a similar crime, an inference of bias 
is raised. Once there is an inference of bias, 
according to the court, "the inference is 
generally not rebutted simply by a subsequent 
general statement by the juror that he or she can 
be fair and impartial." Id. at 445. The court 
concluded that the one compound question asked 
by the trial court and the unequivocal answers of 
the prospective jurors were not sufficient to 
rebut the inference of bias. Id. at 447-48. The 
court therefore reversed defendant's conviction 
and remanded the case for a new trial. 
Woolley is distinguishable from the instant 
case in at least three respects. First, defense 
counsel in Woolley moved to strike all three 
challenged jurors for cause. Where defense 
counsel challenges a juror for cause, the 
decision to remove the juror lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Gotscnall, 
782 P.2d at 462; accord Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 
177. Thus, the Woolley court was required to 
review the trial court's decision not to remove a 
juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. By 
contrast, in the present case, where defense 
counsel did not object to jurors for cause, we 
review the trial court's actions for plain error. 
Elliftitz, 835 P.2d at 174. The threshold 
requirements necessary to demonstrate the trial 
court committed plain error are much higher 
than those required to demonstrate the trial court 
committed an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the 
holding in Woolley is not applicable where 
defense counsel made no objection for cause to 
the jurors in question, as in the present case. 
Second, Woolley involved a rather unusiu 
situation during voir dire where the trial coui 
removed a prospective juror for cause am 
without further questioning reinstated th 
removed juror. Where the trial court initiall; 
agreed to remove a prospective juror for cause 
some additional questioning of that particula 
juror may be required if the trial court i 
considering reinstating the juror. Such ai 
unusual situation is not, however, present in th< 
instant case. 
Finally, the Woolley court focused on the fac 
that the trial court asked only one compound 
question of the prospective jurors who indicate< 
that they had been victims of similar crimes 
This one question, according to the court, wai 
not sufficient to rebut the inference of bias.41 i 
the instant case, however, the court probed th< 
question of bias with four different questions 
The four questions asked by the trial court in th< 
present case were sufficient to rebut an] 
question of bias regarding prospective juror 
Geurts, Heap, and Pike. 
We conclude, under a plain error analysis 
that the trial court's voir dire was adequate tc 
rebut any question of bias that arose wher 
prospective jurors Geurts, Heap, and Pik* 
indicated they had been victims of similaj 
crimes.5 It follows, therefore, that in light of oui 
holding that there was no error in the voir dire 
conducted by the trial court, there could likewise 
be no prejudice in the procedure that affectec 
the substantial rights of defendant. 
Juror Incompetence 
Defendant further argues that the trial court 
erred by not excusing prospective juror Barbei 
for cause because he was incompetent to serve. 
Defendant's argument is based on the fact that 
Mr. Barber had a scheduling conflict regarding 
his wife's need for physical therapy. This 
scheduling conflict, according to defendant, 
diverted Barber's full attention from the trial and 
therefore rendered him incompetent. 
Defendant misconstrues the meaning of the 
term "incompetent" in this context. Utah Code 
Ann. §78-46-8(2) (1992), in effect at the time of 
defendant's trial,6 defined those individuals 
incompetent to serve as follows: 
(2) The following persons are not competent 
to serve as jurors: 
(a) a person who has been convicted of a 
felony; 
(b) a person serving on active duty in the 
military service of the United States; 
(c) a person who is not capable because of 
a physical or mental disability of rendering 
satisfactory jury service. Any person who 
claims this disqualification may be required 
to submit a physician's certificate verifying 
the disability and the certifying physician is 
subject to inquiry by the court at its 
discretion; or 
(d) a person who does not meet the 
requirements of Section 78-46-7.7 
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While prospective juror Barber may have had a 
scheduling conflict, he was not, as a matter of 
law, incompetent to serve on defendant's jury. 
The trial court did not commit plain error, 
therefore, by not removing Barber for cause due 
to incompetence. 
Defendant claims, however, that since Barber 
may have been distracted, he was unable to 
serve impartially. This argument is without 
merit. Incompetence does not deal with bias or 
prejudice. Bias and prejudice refer to a "state of 
mind [that] exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging [the prospective juror]." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). Bias and prejudice, 
therefore, refer to a state of mind that would 
lead a juror to favor one party over another. A 
challenge for cause will lie against a juror who 
is incompetent or biased or both. However, they 
are not overlapping characteristics as urged by 
defendant. 
Juror Barber did not indicate that he was, in 
any way, biased or prejudiced against the 
defendant or the prosecution. There was not 
even a question of bias raised, which would 
have required the trial court to probe further. 
All Mr. Barber indicated was that he had a 
scheduling conflict that might demand some of 
his attention. If the question were answered 
forthrightly, many prospective jurors would 
probably admit that something in their personal 
lives could cause them to divert some of their 
attention from the trial. Such distractions, 
however, do not rise to the level of a challenge 
for cause.8 
We conclude that the trial court did not 
commit plain error in seating juror Barber. It 
likewise follows, that since there was no error 
committed in seating Mr. Barber, there could be 
no prejudice in the procedure that affected the 
substantial rights of defendant.9 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Defendant argues, in the alternative, that his 
counsel was ineffective in not challenging for 
cause prospective jurors Geurts, Heap, Pike, and 
Barber. Because we have concluded that 
defendant was not in any way prejudiced by voir 
dire, defendant could not have been prejudiced 
by the conduct of his counsel. Ellifiitz, 835 P.2d 
at 174 ("Failure to meet the plain error 
requirement of prejudice means that defendant 
likewise fails to meet the required showing 
under the ineffective assistance of counsel 
standard."). Defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim therefore fails. j 
Convictions for Robbery and Burglary 
Defendant argues that his convictions for 
robbery and burglary illegally punish him twice 
for the same crime, since "one could not have 
committed the robbery without necessarily 
committing the burglary." Defendant argues, 
therefore, that his sentence underlying the I 
burglary' conviction is illegal and should be 
vacated. Defendant failed, however, to raise this 
issue before the trial court. We are governed by 
the general principle that matters not placed in 
issue before the trial court may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. See State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 
1991). Defendant does not argue that the trial 
court committed plain error in sentencing him 
for burglary, thus allowing us to address it for 
the first time on appeal, but instead he argues 
that under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
22(e) a court can correct an illegal sentence at 
any time. Rule 22(e) provides that a court may 
"correct an illegal sentence, or one imposed in 
an illegal manner, at any time." This rule, 
however, is directed to the trial courts and 
defendant must first ask the trial court to correct 
his sentence if he believes that it has been 
imposed in an illegal manner. State v. Gallegos, 
849 P.2d 586, 591-92 (Utah App. 1993); see 
also State v. Lee Zim, 79 Utah 68, 74, 7 P.2d 
825, 827 (1932) (trial court may always 
reassume jurisdiction to correct an erroneous or 
illegal sentence). We therefore may not address 
defendant's argument on his convictions for the 
first time on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not commit plain error by 
not removing for cause jurors Geurts, Heap, and 
Pike. The trial court also did not commit plain 
error by not removing for cause juror Barber. 
Because of our conclusion on the plain error 
issues, defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim likewise fails. We may not 
address defendant's argument that he is being 
illegally punished twice for the same crime since 
that issue was raised for the first time on appeal. 
We therefore affirm defendant's conviction. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting pursuant to 
appointment under Utah Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) 
(1992). 
2. Where defense counsel moves to strike jurors for 
cause, we review the trial court's ruling for an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 
(Utah 1989); accord Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 177. 
3. In Garrett, we also discussed additional 
requirements that must be satisfied in order for us to 
address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on 
direct appeal. 
In addition to the substantive requirements . . 
. there is a threshold requirement that must be 
met before we may consider an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. 
Ordinarily, such a claim may only be raised 
through a collateral attack in habeas corpus 
proceedings because "the trial record is 
insufficient to allow the claim to be determined" 
on direct appeal. State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 
1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). Consequently, we may 
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consider an ineffective assistance claim on direct 
appeal only if the record is adequate to permit a 
decision. A trial record is adequate only if "we 
are not aware of any evidence or arguments 
which might be made that is [sic] not now before 
us." Id. 
849 P.2d at 580 (footnote omitted). Finally, in order 
to address an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
on direct appeal, defendant must also be "represented 
by new counsel on appeal because it is 'unreasonable 
to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of his own 
ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal.'" Id. at 580 
n.3 (quoting Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619, 621 
(Utah 1989)). 
4. However, in Hornsby we held that one general 
question was sufficient to rebut any questions 
involving juror bias. 758 P.2d at 933. In Hornsby, 
plaintiffs counsel requested, since Hornsby was suing 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, that 
the trial court inquire into the religious affiliations of 
the prospective jurors. The trial court refused to 
inquire into individual affiliations and instead asked 
the following question: 
Are there any of you who feel that you would 
have trouble being an impartial juror because of 
feelings you may have either pro or con with 
regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think might 
affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror 
in this case? If so, I'd like you to raise your 
hand. 
Id. at 931-32. None of the prospective jurors raised a 
hand. We held that "the question asked by the trial 
court was sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias 
to warrant a challenge for cause under [Utah R. Civ. 
P. 47(f)(6)]." A/, at 932. 
5. Defendant argues that it was reversible error to 
require him to use a peremptory challenge on 
prospective juror Geurts since she should have been 
removed for cause. See State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 
768 (Utah 1980) (it is reversible error to compel 
defense counsel to use peremptory challenges to 
remove prospective jurors that should have been 
removed for cause); but see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 81, 86 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2277 (1988) (focus is 
not whether defendant was required to use peremptory 
challenge to strike juror who should have been 
removed for cause, but on whether jury that actually 
sat was fair and impartial). However, in light of our 
holding that prospective juror Geurts was not subject 
to removal for cause, defendant's argument fails. 
6. Section 78-46-8 was amended effective July 1, 
1992. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-8 (Supp. 1993). 
7. Utah Code Ann. §78-46-7 (1992), in effect at the 
time of defendant's trial, provided as follows: 
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if 
the person is: 
(a) a citizen of the United States; 
(b) over the age of 18 years; 
(c) a resident of the county; and 
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the 
English language. 
(2) In municipalities which are not primary or 
secondary locations for the circuit court, a person 
is not competent to serve as a juror in cases 
involving the violation of a municipal ordinance 
unless the person, in addition to meeting the 
requirements listed in Subsection (1), resides 
within the municipality whose ordinance is 
alleged to have been violated or, in the case of a 
municipality with a population of fewer than 
3,000 persons, resides within 15 miles of the 
municipality. 
Section 78-46-7 was amended in 1992 and 1993. Utah 
Code Ann. §78-46-7 (Supp. 1993). 
8. The trial court has discretion to excuse jurors who 
have severe scheduling conflicts. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-46-15 (1992), in effect at the time of defendant's 
trial, provided: 
(1) The court, upon request of a prospective 
juror or on its own initiative, shall determine on 
the basis of information provided on the juror 
qualification form or by interview with the 
prospective juror, or by other competent 
evidence, whether the prospective juror should be 
excused from jury service. The clerk shall enter 
this determination in the space provided on the 
juror qualification form. 
(2) A person may be excused from jury service 
by the court, at its discretion, upon a showing of 
undue hardship, extreme inconvenience,or public 
necessity for any period the court deems 
necessary. 
Section 78-46-15 was amended effective July 1, 1992. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-46-15 (Supp. 1993). 
9. In view of this disposition we need not rule upon 
the State's Contingent Motion to allow it to 
supplement the record with an affidavit from juror 
Barber. 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Blaine Construction Co., Inc. (Blaine), appeals 
the trial court's grant of a partial summary 
judgment requiring Blaine to indemnify a 
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M[I]t is never too late to do justice. . . . " 
The court is constituted to enforce legal rights 
and redress legal wrongs, and whenever it is made 
to appear, as it is in this case, that a wrong 
has been perpetrated, it never hesitates to 
exercise the power which it has, unless to do so 
would do a greater injury than to refuse to 
exercise it. 
State v. Morgan, 64 P. 356, 362 (Utah 1901)(citation omitted). 
II. 
MR. BROOKS' CONVICTION FOR 
BURGLARY MUST BE STRICKEN. 
Mr. Brooks was convicted of both aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary for the event which occurred at the Vert 
residence on January 29, 1991 (R. 203-204). The constitutional law 
governing this issue is set forth in Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 
(Utah App. 1990), as follows: 
[N]o person may be placed in jeopardy for the 
same criminal offense more than once. U.S. 
Const, amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, §12. The 
federal and state double jeopardy guarantees are 
viewed as having the same content, affording 
defendants three separate protections: no second 
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, 
no second prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction, and no multiple punishments for the 
same offense. 
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(2)(a) provides, MNo person 
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense." Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-1-402 provides additional statutory protection from 
multiple punishments for one crime, stating: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a 
single criminal action for all separate offenses 
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arising out of a single criminal episode;2 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a 
single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under 
different provisions of this code, the act shall 
be punishable under only one such provision; an 
acquittal or conviction and sentence under any 
such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
The statutory term "act" is defined as "a voluntary bodily movement 
and includes speech." Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601(1). State v. 
Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1989). 
The relevant "act" for purposes of the statute and double 
jeopardy was the armed robbery.3 The robbery occurred after 
Stephanie allowed the young man into Vert residence and began making 
coffee for them. Under the Utah Code and the facts of this case, 
there was no separate act underlying the burglary conviction, which 
2. "[A]11 conduct which is closely related in time and is 
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective" constitutes a "single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-401. 
3. Robbery is defined as "the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by 
means of force or fear." Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301. Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-6-302 defines aggravated robbery as follows: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree 
felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be considered to be "in the course of 
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt 
to commit, during the commission of, or in the 
immediate flight after the attempt or commission 
of a robbery. 
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required the unlawful remaining in the Vert residence with a gun and 
the intent to commit a robbery.4 "Remaining" is not a "voluntary 
bodily movement;" it is necessarily encompassed in the robbery. On 
the facts of this case, one could not have committed the robbery 
without necessarily committing the burglary. The burglary 
conviction should be reversed. See Duran, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-1-601(1), supra. 
While the trial counsel did not raise this issue, this 
Court should nonetheless address it on the merits. Authority for 
vacating the illegal sentence underlying the burglary conviction is 
provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), which states, 
"The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in 
an illegal manner, at any time." Issues concerning the dual 
punishment for one crime are considered sentencing issues. E.g. 
State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990). The rule permits 
4. "A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person." Utah 
Code Ann. section 76-6-202. 
Aggravated burglary is defined by Utah Code Ann. section 
76-6-203 as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary the actor or another participant 
in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who 
is not a participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or dangerous weapon. 
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justice to be done regardless of whether the illegal sentence is 
addressed in the trial court. E.g. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 
(Utah), cert, denied 112 S.Ct. 883 (1992). 
Alternatively, this Court should utilize the plain error 
doctrine to address the merits of Mr. Brooks' illegal sentence. The 
error in convicting and sentencing Mr. Brooks for two separate first 
degree felonies for one crime should have been plain to the trial 
court. Allowing Mr. Brooks to suffer a superfluous first degree 
felony conviction and sentence is prejudicial. See State v. 
Eldredge, supra, discussing the plain error doctrine. 
Alternatively, trial counsel's failure to raise this issue 
was objectively deficient and prejudicial. Mr. Brooks should not be 
punished for his attorney's failure to raise this sentencing issue, 
and this Court may reach the merits of this issue and correct the 
error under the auspices of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
doctrine. See Strickland, ABA Standards, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Brooks' convictions and order 
a new trial with a voir dire that is adequate to provide a fair and 
impartial jury. This Court should order that upon Mr. Brooks' 
retrial, he may not be convicted of and sentenced for both robbery 
and burglary. 
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performance might be made. By presuming harm in such cases, the 
waiver rule—which clearly applies to jury selection, see Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(c)(2), would effectively be swallowed by its "counsel 
ineffectiveness- exception. Instead, the finality of trial court 
judgments should be supported, by upholding the waiver rule 
against jury selection challenges that are raised for the first 
time on appeal.16 
The burden to show actual harm from counsel blunders in 
jury selection, then, properly rests with defendant, as does the 
burden of proving that actual blunders were made. Having failed 
to carry either burden, defendant's allegation of trial counsel 
ineffectiveness should be rejected. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND AGGRAVATED BURGLARY. 
Defendant makes another argument, also unpreserved by 
trial-level objection, that he could not be convicted of both 
16Sounder Utah cases finding reversible error in preserved 
jury selection issues have been those in which the challenged 
jurors acknowledged actual bias. See, e.g.; State v. Jones, 734 
P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987) (two jurors admitted that they would be 
affected by close ties to murder victim's family); State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984) (juror expressed bias for 
prosecution and stated, "In essence, I would prefer not to be 
here"); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (two 
jurors "expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration" as 
victims of crimes similar to that being tried); Jenkins v. 
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 535-36 (Utah 1981) (juror admitted 
tendency to believe defendant physician in malpractice suit); 
State v. Bailev. 605 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah 1980) (two jurors agreed 
that police testimony could be relied upon "to the utmost"); 
Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Utah 1975) (juror in 
wrongful death action expressed "strong feelings" about trying to 
recover money for the death of another). Again here, no such 
admittedly-biased jurors were allowed to sit. 
33 
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. This argument, 
essentially that the burglary was a lesser included offense 
within the robbery, should be summarily rejected. 
This Court need consider neither plain error nor 
counsel ineffectiveness as bases for overcoming defendant's 
trial-level waiver of this argument. Had defendant objected to 
either the dual charges or the dual convictions in the trial 
court, the objection would have been correctly denied. Under 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301(1) (1990), robbery includes the element 
of "taking of personal property" through force or fear. The act 
of "taking" is not part of the offense of burglary.17 
Burglary, however, defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (1990), does include an element that is not part of the 
robbery definition: the act of "enter[ing] or remain[ing] in a 
building" with criminal intent. The Utah Supreme Court has 
squarely rejected defendant's argument that "remaining" is not an 
"act" for the purposes of the burglary statute. See State v. 
Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing 
1988). Accordingly, once defendant wore out his welcome in the 
Vert home by threatening and handcuffing Stephanie Vert within 
the home, he committed burglary- See id. Then, when he took 
17The "aggravating" element for aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary is quite similar, that is, the possession or 
use of a "dangerous weapon" in the course of the offense. Utah 
Code Ann. SS 76-6-203, 76-6-302 (1990). Therefore, the State 
analyzes only the simple robbery and simple burglary statutes for 
the purpose of this argument. 
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property from the home, an act accomplished with the aid of that 
threat and assault, defendant committed robbery. 
In short, the offenses of aggravated robbery and 
aggravated burglary, while overlapping, each contain an element 
not found within the other* This makes them separate criminal 
offenses, for which defendant was properly tried and convicted, 
even though they were committed during a "single criminal 
episode," under Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1990). See State v. 
Eichler, 584 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah 1978) (robbery and kidnapping 
during same episode: both convictions affirmed); State v. Jones, 
13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 (1962) (burglary and theft (then 
larceny) during same episode: both convictions affirmed); Duran 
v. Cook, 788 P.2d 1038 (Utah App. 1990) (same). Defendant's 
argument to the contrary, which ignores controlling legal 
precedent, is therefore meritless. 
CONCLUSION 
Our adversary system of justice did not fail this 
defendant. He received a fair trial, and the convictions 
resulting from that trial should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ ^ day of March, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
J. KEVIN MURPHYv » 
Assistant Attorney General 
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deliberations. When there are fundamental structural errors such 
as this, prejudice should be presumed. See brief of appellant at 
20-23. ££. Vasouez v. Hillerv, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986)(Court 
could not rely on defendant's conviction to apply harmless error 
analysis to racial discrimination in the selection of the grand 
jury, because Court could not determine whether the defendant 
would have been indicted at all in the absence of the error in 
the grand jury proceedings). 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE THE AGGRAVATED BURGLARY CONVICTION. 
Mr. Brooks is arguing that the aggravated burglary 
conviction should be stricken because it did not involve a 
separate act from the acts essential to the aggravated robbery 
conviction, as the term act is defined by Utah Code Ann. section 
76-1-601(1) (a voluntary bodily movement). Brief of appellant at 
23-27. In response, the State argues, "The Utah Supreme Court 
has squarely rejected defendant's argument that 'remaining' is 
not an 'act' for the purposes of the burglary statute. See State 
v. Bradley. 752 P.2d 974, 876 (Utah 1985, amended on rehearing 
1988)." Brief of appellee at 34. A copy of the Bradley decision 
is in appendix 2 to this brief. Nowhere in the Bradley decision 
does the Utah Supreme Court address the question. 
In order to convict one of aggravated burglary, the 
State must prove that one entered or remained unlawfully in a 
building with the intent to commit a felony with a firearm. Utah 
Code Ann. sections 76-6-202 and 203. It was the State's theory 
14 
in this case that Mr. Brooks remained unlawfully in the Vert 
residence; there was no evidence that Mr. Brooks entered the Vert 
residence unlawfully --he did so with the consent of Stephanie 
Vert. Because remaining is not a voluntary bodily movement, it 
is not an act under the Utah Code justifying a separate 
conviction bearing a five to life prison sentence. Because on 
the facts of this case, the jurors were not required to find that 
Mr. Brooks committed any act for the aggravated burglary 
conviction that was not already committed for the aggravated 
robbery conviction, this Court should reverse the aggravated 
robbery conviction. See Bradley. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Brooks' convictions 
and order a new trial. 
n Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1993 
Attorney for tfr. Brooks 
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